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PUBLIC INTEREST REPRESENTATION IN 








This paper compares the institutional and procedural arrangements that a 
range of global institutions make for civil society representation and input 
into policy development processes on intellectual property issues.  The 
context for this analysis comes from two sets of norms for multi-
stakeholder public policy development that exist in other regimes of 
governance: those of the Aarhus Convention (for environmental matters),  
and those of the Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (for Internet 
governance).  These global norms, along with the actual practices of the 
institutions involved in global governance of intellectual property rights, 
are then contrasted with the proposed new institutional mechanisms for 
ACTA, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement.  It is found that ACTA 
falls short even of the practices of the other institutions analysed, but far 
shorter of the ideals promulgated in the Aarhus Convention and the Tunis 
Agenda.  Whilst the shortcomings of the ACTA negotiation process are 
largely to blame for this, an underlying problem is the lack of a normative 
framework for civil society representation and participation in intellectual  
property policy development.
                                         
1
 At the time this paper was researched and written, the July 1, 2010 draft of ACTA 
was the most recent draft of the text.  Any references to ―the most recent text‖ and related 
analysis refer to the July 1, 2010 draft.  After this paper was submitted for publication, a 
new draft of ACTA was leaked on Aug. 25, 2010.  This paper may be revised by the author 
to reflect changes made by the Aug. 25, 2010 draft text. 
2
 Project Coordinator for IP and Communications, Consumers International. 
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One of the most persistent complaints that activists and scholars have 
brought against the process of negotiations for an Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA) is that there has been insufficient openness to civil 
society, by way of transparency
3
 or public consultation.
4
 
The negotiators have repeatedly denied these charges,
5
 but in doing so 
have sometimes appeared surprised that broader civil society even expects 
                                         
3 See Emily Ayoob, Recent Development:  The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 175 (2010). 
4 This has been treated as a ―the responsibility of each ACTA country itself.‖  Mike 
Masnick, ACTA Negotiators Respond to Questions about ACTA; More of the Same, 
TECHDIRT (June 29, 2010, 12:28 PM), 
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100629/10381810004.shtml.  However some of the 
negotiating countries that have held their own public consultation meetings (and not all 
have) have done so under conditions unfavourable to civil society.  See Issa Villarreal, 
Concerns About Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), GLOBAL VOICES ONLINE 
(Feb. 25, 2010), http://globalvoicesonline.org/2010/02/25/global-concerns-about-anti-
counterfeiting-trade-agreement-acta/. 
5 See Masnick, supra note 4, Monika Emert, European Commission on ACTA: 
TRIPS Is Floor Not Ceiling, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH (April 22, 2009, 7:18 PM), 
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2009/04/22/european-commission-on-acta-trips-is-floor-
not-ceiling/. 
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to be consulted on this agreement.  After all, they suggest, ACTA ―is not 
about limiting civil liberties or harassing consumers.‖
6
 
In other contexts, this would seem a rather naïve attitude.  For example, 
as this paper will show, the importance of accountability of and 
transparency in decision-making, and the public's right to be consulted 
during the preparation of normative instruments, are quite rudimentary 
concepts in both environmental law and in Internet governance. 
However, having been raised, the question should be squarely 
addressed:  since governments (or at least those that are negotiating ACTA) 
are the democratically elected representatives of their citizens, what need is 
there for civil society to be directly involved in the negotiation and 
implementation of an international agreement at all? 
The simplest answer is that at the international level, policy-making 
suffers from serious democratic deficits.  That is to say, with each layer that 
representatives are removed from the citizens they represent, their 
democratic legitimacy is reduced.  The diplomats who represent nation 
states in intergovernmental organisations are not directly accountable to 
their electorates at home, and nor does their national parliament necessarily 
have any opportunity to ratify the decisions they make.
7
 
Indeed, this has been a positive selling point for the countries 
negotiating ACTA, in that, according to many commentators, ACTA has 
been used as a vehicle for ―policy laundering‖ by allowing controversial 
policy changes to be negotiated away from domestic venues, until an 
international obligation to implement those changes is in place, at which 
time any domestic opposition will come too late.
8
 
Lacking adequate accountability to their citizens through domestic 
democratic processes, the policy-making activities of governments within 
international institutions can only be legitimized through additional public 
accountability at that level. As one scholar puts it: 
 
The reliance on democratic principles and the 
                                         
6 Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Answer to a Written Question, ACTA Negotiations and 
Telecoms Package Principles (Feb. 4, 2010), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2009-
6094&language=EN. 
7 This varies from one country to another, but the United States, for example, is 
negotiating ACTA as an ―Executive Agreement‖ that requires only the consent of the 
President, not the Congress.  See Eddan Katz and Gwen Hinze, The Impact of the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement on the Knowledge Economy:  The Accountability of the 
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative for the Creation of IP Enforcement Norms Through 
Executive Trade Agreements, 35 YALE J. INT'L. L. 24 (2009). 
8 See David Kravets, Copyright Treaty is Policy Laundering at its Finest, (Nov. 4, 
2009, 7:59 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/11/policy-laundering. 
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consent of the governed, which legitimize political 
decisions in the Western tradition, are of little help in 
international affairs.  The ―democratic deficit‖ of 
international organizations is a commonplace.  
Rather, the international lawyer must justify his 
authority by the acceptance of the results of his 
activity by his audience and addressees, in particular 




Thus it is here that the place of civil society comes in.  Even the United 
Nations has acknowledged the importance of civil society's role in 
legitimizing policy-making within international institutions.  The Cardoso 
report on civil society presented to the U.N. General Assembly in 2004 
recommended ―that the United Nations can make an important contribution 
to strengthening democracy and widening its reach by helping to connect 
national democratic processes with international issues and by expanding 
roles for civil society in deliberative processes.‖
10
 
It is in this context that institutions in several global governance 
domains (or regimes, as they will be termed here)
11
 have begun to reform 
their structures and processes to increase their transparency and 
accountability to civil society, and to allow NGOs—that is, the actors who 
constitute organised global civil society—greater levels of participation in 
policy development. 
The next section will briefly describe two sets of norms or principles 
that have guided this ongoing process, respectively within the regimes of 
international environmental law and Internet governance. 
 
II. OTHER REGIMES 
 
A. Environmental Law 
  
The 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(or Earth Summit) was a major event in which the governments of 172 
                                         
9 Andreas L. Paulus, From Territoriality to Functionality? Towards a Legal 
Methodology of Globalization, in GOVERNANCE AND INT’L LEGAL THEORY 59, 61 (Ige F. 
Dekker, et al. ed., 2004). 
10 Chair of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations—Civil Society, Report 
of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations—Civil Society Relations, 24, U.N. Doc. 
A/58/817 (June 11, 2004), available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/376/41/PDF/N0437641.pdf. 
11 Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as 
Intervening Variables, 36 INT'L ORG., 185  (1982). 
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countries joined with 2,400 NGO representatives to develop several 
agreements addressing issues of environmental conservation and climate 
change.
12
  One of these agreements was the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development,
13
 which relevantly provides 
 
Principle 10. Public participation  
 
Environmental issues are best handled with the 
participation of all concerned citizens, at the relevant 
level.  At the national level, each individual shall 
have appropriate access to information concerning 
the environment that is held by public authorities . . . 
and the opportunity to participate in decision-making 
processes.  States shall facilitate and encourage 
public awareness and participation by making 
information widely available.  Effective access to 
judicial and administrative proceedings, including 
redress and remedy, shall be provided. 
 
Although non-binding in itself, this declaration formed the basis for the 
subsequent binding UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters, otherwise known as the Aarhus Convention.
14
 
The parties to the Aarhus Convention are over forty European and 
Central Asian members of the United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe (UNECE), including the European Union.  The United States, 
although a member of the UNECE, is not a party to the Convention.  It did, 
however, attend the first conference of the parties in 1992 to voice its 
exception to the significant role that the Convention accorded to NGOs, 
stating that it would ―not regard this regime as precedent.‖
15
 
That said, the Convention is indeed somewhat remarkable.  Whereas 
                                         
12 See STANLEY JOHNSON, THE EARTH SUMMIT:  THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE 
ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT (UNCED) (1993). 
13 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janiero, 
Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I), Annex I (June 13, 1992), available at 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm. 
14 See Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in 
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 
517 [hereinafter Aarhus convention]. 
15 Svitlana Kravchenko, The Aarhus Convention and Innovations in Compliance 
with Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 18 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1, 3 
(2007). 
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most international agreements grant rights only to states,
16
 the Aarhus 
Convention provides significant rights to the public, including: 
 
1. The right to access environmental information (Article 4), 
coupled with a duty upon each party to collect and disseminate 
such information (Article 5). 
2. The right to public participation in decisions with 
environmental impact: 
a. relating to specific environmentally-sensitive activities such 
as mineral extraction or refinement (Article 6); 
b. concerning plans, programmes and policies relating to the 
environment (Article 7); and 
c. during the preparation of executive regulations and/or 
generally applicable legally binding normative instruments 
(Article 8). 
3. Access to justice—that is, to independent review of a party's 
decisions (Article 9). 
 
In the case of non-compliance by a state party, any member of the 
public may make a communication about this to the Convention's 
Compliance Committee, which will make a recommendation on the merits 
of the case to a full Meeting of the Parties.  Meetings of the Compliance 
Committee are completely open to the public, and NGOs are readily 
accredited to attend Meetings of the Parties. 
Article 8 is worth setting out in full.  It provides:  
 
Public Participation During the Preparation of . . . 
Binding Normative Instruments  
 
Each Party shall strive to promote effective public 
participation at an appropriate stage, and while 
options are still open, during the preparation by 
public authorities of executive regulations and other 
generally applicable legally binding rules that may 
have a significant effect on the environment.  To this 
end, the following steps should be taken: 
                                         
16 However, the first Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights grants individuals direct rights of audience before the Human Rights 
Committee of the United Nations in respect of alleged infringements of their rights.  See 
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S 171.  The United States is not a party to this instrument, either. 




a) Time-frames sufficient for effective participation 
should be fixed;  
b) Draft rules should be published or otherwise 
made publicly available; and  
c) The public should be given the opportunity to 
comment, directly or through representative 
consultative bodies. 
d) The result of the public participation shall be 
taken into account as far as possible. 
  
Substituting ―access to knowledge‖ for ―the environment,‖ the most 
ardent opponent of ACTA could hardly ask for more than already exists as 
binding international law in the environmental governance regime. 
 
B. Internet Governance 
 
The World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), like the Earth 
Summit, was a large scale United Nations summit meeting, attended by 175 
governments and over 12,000 participants, which resulted in the 
development of several agreements:  two at the first phase of the meeting 
held in Geneva in 2003, and another two at the second phase held in Tunisia 
in 2005. 
These documents are not treaties, and they do not bind the governments 
that agreed to them, still less the private sector and civil society delegates 
who contributed their own submissions during the WSIS preparatory 
conferences at which the texts were drafted.  They are, in other words, 
instruments of ―soft‖ rather than ―hard‖ international law.
17
  Even so, 
supported by the large majority of the world's governments, they carry 
considerable normative weight within the Internet governance regime. 
Of these agreements, those which call for attention here are the Geneva 
Declaration of Principles
18
 from the first phase, and the Tunis Agenda for 
the Information Society
19
 from the second.  The Declaration of Principles is 
                                         
17 See ANTHONY C. AREND, LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 24 (1999). 
18 See World Summit on the Information Society, Geneva, Switz,, Dec.10-12, 2003, 
Geneva Declaration of Principles, U.N. Doc. WSIS-03/GENEVA/DOC/4-E (Dec. 12, 
2003), available at http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/geneva/official/dop.html [hereinafter 
Geneva Declaration]. 
19 See World Summit on the Information Society, Tunis, Tunis., Nov. 16-18, 2005, 
Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, U.N. Doc. WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/6(Rev. 1)-E 
(Nov. 18, 2005), available at http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.html 
[hereinafter Tunis Agenda]. 
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based around eleven ―key principles for building an inclusive Information 
Society.‖  The first of these concerns the role of governments and all 
stakeholders in the promotion of ICTs for development, and provides: 
 
Governments, as well as private sector, civil society 
and the United Nations and other international 
organizations have an important role and 
responsibility in the development of the Information 
Society and, as appropriate, in decision-making 
processes.  Building a people-centred Information 
Society is a joint effort which requires cooperation 




The Declaration goes on to provide that ―international management of 
the Internet should be multilateral, transparent and democratic, with the full 
involvement of governments, the private sector, civil society and 
international organizations,‖
21
 but—significantly—conditions this with the 
proviso that ―Policy authority for Internet-related public policy issues is the 
sovereign right of States.‖
22
 
In between the first and second phases of WSIS, a Working Group on 
Internet Governance (WGIG) was convened.  In its report, it clarified the 
content of the regime of governance in which all stakeholders were to 
cooperate in partnership, settling on this definition: 
 
Internet governance is the development and application by 
Governments, the private sector and civil society, in their 
respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-
making procedures, and programmes that shape the 




With this groundwork laid, it fell to the second agreement, the Tunis 
Agenda, to address how governments, the private sector and civil society 
were to exercise their respective roles in Internet governance.  This topic is 
addressed in two ways.  The first is by calling for the establishment of ―a 
process of enhanced cooperation‖ by which governments are to lead the 
                                         
20 Geneva Declaration, supra note 18, art. 20. 
21 Id. art. 48. 
22 Id. art. 49(a). 
23 World Summit on the Information Society, Report of the Working Group on 
Internet Governance, U.N. Doc. WSIS-II/PC-3/DOC/5-E (Aug. 3, 2005), available at 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/pc3/html/off5/index.html. 
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development of globally applicable public policy principles for the Internet, 
in consultation with other stakeholders.
24
 
Since 2005, very little concrete progress had been made towards 
establishing this process of enhanced cooperation.  But this changed in May 
2010 when the Commission for Science and Technology for Development 
(CSTD), a committee of the UN's Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 
tasked with responsibility for following up on the implementation of WSIS, 
called upon the Secretary-General to 
 
convene open and inclusive consultations involving 
all member states and all other stakeholders to 
proceed with the process towards the implementation 
of enhanced cooperation in order to enable 
governments, on an equal footing to carry out their 
roles and responsibilities in international public 
policy issues pertaining to the Internet . . . through a 
balanced participation of all stakeholders in their 
respective roles . . . before the end of 2010. 
 
The second mechanism established at Tunis, which is a part of the 
broader process of enhanced cooperation, was the establishment of an 
Internet Governance Forum (IGF), as a new venue for multi-stakeholder 
policy dialogue in which governments could take an equal role and 
responsibility for Internet governance and policy making in consultation 
with all other stakeholders.
25
  
The Tunis Agenda states that the IGF should be multilateral, multi-
stakeholder, democratic and transparent in its working and function, with a 
lightweight and decentralized structure that is subject to periodic review.  It 
is not to replace other relevant fora in which Internet governance issues are 
discussed or to exercise oversight over them or have any binding decision 
making power.  In particular, it is to have no involvement in day-to-day or 
technical operations of the Internet, but should work in parallel with those 
organisations that do, taking advantage of their expertise.
26
  Its mandate, 
inter alia, is to: 
 
a) Discuss public policy issues related to key 
elements of Internet governance in order to foster 
                                         
24 Tunis Agenda, supra note 19, art. 61, 69–71. 
25 See id. art. 67–68. 
26 See id. art. 73, 77 and 79. 
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the sustainability, robustness, security, stability 
and development of the Internet. 
b) Facilitate discourse between bodies dealing with 
different cross-cutting international public 
policies regarding the Internet and discuss issues 
that do not fall within the scope of any existing 
body. 
c) Interface with appropriate intergovernmental 
organizations and other institutions on matters 
under their purview. 
… 
g) Identify emerging issues, bring them to the 
attention of the relevant bodies and the general 





The initial five-year term of the IGF winds up in 2010.  In his review of 
the desirability of the continuation of the IGF, the Secretary-General 
observed some deficiencies in its performance to date, as the CSTD had 
noted deficiencies in the realisation of the process of enhanced cooperation.  
He acknowledged both ―a perception among some civil society stakeholders 
that the agenda-setting process of the MAG is not sufficiently inclusive or 
transparent,‖ as well as the assessment of many ―that the contribution of the 
IGF to public policy-making is difficult to assess and appears to be weak,‖ 
and made recommendations to address these and other problems.
28
 
Even so, the principles of multi-stakeholder governance laid down in the 
Geneva Declaration, and the progress made towards implementing them 
through the Internet Governance Forum and the process towards enhanced 
cooperation, mark a revolutionary shift away from the hierarchical mode of 
intergovernmental rule-making that is still taken for granted in the global 
regime for intellectual property rights.  
  
C. Summary of Principles 
 
 Two sets of norms have been established, respectively, for the 
regimes of environmental and Internet governance, prescribing institutional 
principles for civil society access to and participation in policy development 
                                         
27 Id. art. 72. 
28 U. N. Secretary-General, Continuation of the Internet Governance Forum:  Note 
by the Secretary-General, 8-9, A/65/78- E/2010/68 (May 7, 2010), available at 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan039400.pdf. 
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processes. Relevantly, the Aarhus Convention requires policy makers to 
provide the public with: 
 
 Transparency—or access to information, including draft 
rules. 
 Participation—in decision-making processes at a time when 
options are still open. 
 Recourse—or access to justice in the event that either of the 
first two norms is not observed. 
 
The requirements of the Geneva Declaration and the Tunis Agenda of 
WSIS are broadly similar, though at a higher level of principle.  They 




 Participation—that is multilateral, democratic and inclusive 




Notably, there is no provision in the WSIS process criteria for the public 
to take recourse in the event that their rights to transparency and 
participation are not met; instead, the IGF is directed as part of its mandate 
to ―Promote and assess, on an ongoing basis, the embodiment of WSIS 
principles in Internet governance processes.‖
30
 
The norm of recourse will therefore be set aside for now, both because it 
is not common to each of the above regimes, and because in the short term 
its proposal as a norm for the intellectual property regime seems over-
ambitious—not least because the United States has made clear that it will 
not abide the public having right of action against a state for non-
compliance with international law.
31
 
What remains, then, are the norms of transparency and participation 
(which could also be called ―access‖).
32
  On the positive side, these are 
general enough to be posited as appropriate guiding principles for global 
intellectual property policy development, drawing on the model of the 
                                         
29 See Geneva Declaration, supra note 18, art. 48; Tunis Agenda, supra note 19, arts. 
61, 68, 73. 
30 Tunis Agenda, supra note 19, art. 72. 
31  See Kravchenko, supra note 15. 
32 See Jens Steffek & Patrizia Nanz, Emergent Patterns of Civil Society 
Participation in European and Global Governance in CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION IN 
EUROPEAN AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 1, 10 (Jens Steffek, et al. ed., 2008). 
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environmental and Internet governance regimes.  However, they lack 
sufficient substantive content to be of much use as standards for assessing 
the democratic legitimacy of the negotiation (and later operation) of ACTA. 
After all, the ACTA negotiators, implausible as it may sound, have 
claimed that they already satisfy or even exceed all appropriate standards of 
transparency and participation; stating ―for international trade negotiations 
we normally do not have such a democracy [sic] exercise where everybody 
can raise their concern,‖
33




What is needed therefore are some appropriate metrics of transparency 
and participation that can be used for comparison. 
 
III. METRICS OF TRANSPARENCY AND PARTICIPATION 
 
This is easier said than done, in that there is no cookie-cutter template of 
structures and procedures that policy-making institutions can apply to 
support transparency and participation.  So much depends on the purpose of 
the organization, its composition, and the type of role it plays in 
governance; for example, does it have a policy setting role in its own right, 
or a role of advocacy directed towards policy makers elsewhere, or does it 
simply coordinate the activities of its constituents—or some combination?
35
 
Despite the difficulty of applying absolute standards to such diverse 
governance institutions, there have been scholarly efforts to develop 
checklists of criteria that can be applied to rate transparency and the 
openness to participation in a quantitative fashion.  One such study of 
transparency and the democratic deficit of global institutions identified no 
fewer than twenty-seven criteria, grouped into four categories—public 
access, internal governance, member conduct and accountability.
36
 
Another study, looking at civil society participation in global 
governance institutions, found that such participation could be facilitated in 
at least five ways: 
 
1. Making special institutional arrangements for civil society 
consultation; such as joint workshops, seminars or public 
                                         
33 Emert, supra note 5. 
34 Masnick, supra note 4. 
35 See Jens Martens, Multistakeholder Partnerships: Future Models of 
Multilateralism? in DIALOGUE ON GLOBALIZATION 21 (Jan. 2007), available at 
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/04244.pdf. 
36 See Chris Skelcher, Navdeep Mathur & Mike Smith, The Public Governance of 
Collaborative Spaces: Discourse, Design and Democracy, 83 PUB. ADMIN. 584 (2005). 




2. Allowing NGOs to submit their own documentation to the 
international organization. 
3. Allowing NGOs to attend their intergovernmental political 
meetings as observers. 
4. Allowing NGOs to intervene actively in the 
intergovernmental process of policy deliberation and address 
delegates directly. 





The present paper will take a simpler approach, similar to that already 
taken above when drawing out the two broad principles of transparency and 
participation from the regimes of environmental and Internet governance.  
In this case, however, we will look within the regime of intellectual 
property policy making, to draw out some specific best practices related to 
transparency and participation, from other institutions in that regime.   
   
A. Intellectual Property Policy Institutions 
 




 WIPO (World Intellectual Property Organization).  As the 
intergovernmental organization that administers the major 
global treaties on copyright and related rights (the Berne and 
Rome Conventions
39
 and the WIPO Internet Treaties
40
) as 
well as on patents and trademarks (the Paris Convention),
41
 
                                         
37 Steffek, supra note 32, at 13. 
38 Of course, this list is not complete.  Amongst the other institutions that could have 
been included are ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, which 
sets domain name policy and has a large contingent of trade mark owners amongst its 
stakeholders), the Council of Europe (whose work in promoting human rights is relevant to 
issues of intellectual property enforcement), the WHO (World Health Organization, which 
is required to deal with pharmaceutical patent issues), UNESCO (United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, which has been a venue for debates over 
―communications rights‖) and the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme, which 
promotes the use of open source software for development). 
39 See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sep. 9, 
1886, 1161 U.N.T.S. 30; Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of 
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, 26 Oct. 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43. 
40 See WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76; 
WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65. 
41 See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305. 
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WIPO is perhaps the central international actor in the 
regime. 
 
 WTO (World Trade Organization).  The WTO administers 
the TRIPS agreement,
42
 which largely incorporates the 
substantive content of the WIPO-administered conventions, 
except that it allows signatories to seek redress against each 
other for the breach of the agreement through the WTO's 
dispute resolution process. 
 OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development). The OECD differs from WIPO and the WTO 
in that it concludes few ―hard law‖ treaties amongst its 32 
member countries, but more ―soft law‖ instruments such as 
recommendations and standards.  Its work on intellectual 
property rights is of this kind.
43
  
 CSTD (Commission on Science and Technology for 
Development). The CSTD has already been mentioned with 
respect to its role of coordinating the system-wide follow-up 
on WSIS, including action lines on intellectual property 
issues.
44
  It also does not have a role in producing ―hard 
law,‖ but simply advises the UN General Assembly and 
ECOSOC. 
 IGF (Internet Governance Forum).  Although formed under 
the auspices of the United Nations pursuant to an 
intergovernmental compact at WSIS, the IGF is a multi-
stakeholder body, with governments and civil society 
participants possessing equal formal status. It is not 
specifically mandated to deal with intellectual property 
issues,
45
 but has done so in practice. 
                                         
42 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197. 
43 See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 
COMPENDIUM OF OECD WORK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (IP), (2007), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/61/34305040.pdf. 
44 Notably under the third action line on ―Access to information and knowledge.‖  
See World Summit on the Information Society, Geneva Plan of Action, U.N. Doc. WSIS-
04/GENEVA/DOC/5-E (Dec. 12, 2003), available at 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/geneva/official/poa.html#c3. 
45 See JEREMY MALCOLM, MULTI-STAKEHOLDER GOVERNANCE AND THE INTERNET 
GOVERNANCE FORUM 71 (2008). 




The following table summarizes some of the most significant strengths 
and weaknesses of each of these institutions with respect to their 
transparency and the opportunities that they provide for civil society to 




Organization Transparency Participation 
 Strengths  Weaknesses  Strengths  Weaknesses  
WIPO  Distributes both 
official 
documents and 
negotiating texts  
Not pro-active in  
disseminating 




NGO input comes 






 NGOs have 
speaking and 
submission rights  
 












to NGO observers  
No NGO access to 
TRIPS Council 
meetings 
   NGO position 
papers posted 
online  
No distribution of 
NGO documents 
at meetings 





speaking rights for 
NGOs 













   Ministerial 
Meeting open to 
NGO observers 
 
CSTD  All documents 
published openly  
Negotiation texts 
made available, 




NGO input comes 
last after all 
governments have 
spoken  
                                         
46 More information can be found in a study published by Knowledge Ecology 
International, covering a slightly different set of organizations—the WTO, WIPO, WHO, 
UNCITRAL (United Nations Commission on International Trade Law), Unidroit 
(International Institute for the Unification of Private Law), UNCTAD (United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development), OECD and Hague Conference on Private 
International Law.  The negotiations of five international treaties, within and outside the 
UN system are also considered.  See Knowledge Ecology International, ACTA is Secret. 
How Transparent are Other Global Norm Setting Exercises? (July 21, 2009), 
http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/4/attachment1_transparency_ustr.pdf; Knowledge 
Ecology International, Transparency of negotiating documents in selected fora (July 21, 
2009), http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/4/attachment2_transparency_ustr.pdf; 
Knowledge Ecology International, Participation by the Public in Selected Negotiations 
(July 21, 2009), http://www.keionline.org/misc-docs/4/attachment3_transparency_ustr.pdf.  
16 Public Interest Presentation in Global IP 
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP 
   NGOs have 
speaking and 
submission rights  
 
IGF  All documents 
published  openly 
MAG mailing list 
is private, with 
anonymized 
summaries 
Open forum, all 
participants 
formally equal  
No official outputs  





input and policy 
makers 
 
A few words about each of the institutions in this table are in order.  
Probably the least transparent and participatory body shown here is the 
WTO, which although having improved its documentary transparency in 
recent years, remains notorious for its limited engagement with civil 
society,
47
 and for its exclusion of developing countries from the closed-door 
―green room‖ negotiations it hosts. 
WIPO fares better, in that it allows accredited NGO representatives into 
all its plenary negotiating sessions (though there are, as in the WTO, also 
closed-door sessions between country blocs).  However, the interaction 
between NGOs and governments is stilted at best, because civil society 
interventions are left until last, and the time given for them is strictly 
limited.  Moreover, that time must be shared with interventions from 
business groups, which WIPO also classes as ―NGOs.‖ 
The OECD takes a different approach to WIPO, in that rather than 
granting NGOs observer status at intergovernmental meetings, it has 
established a dedicated body, the CSISAC (Civil Society Information 
Society Advisory Council) to contribute to its policy work.
48
  On the other 
hand, when the OECD has negotiated hard law agreements, notably a failed 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment, its transparency and openness to 
participation have been much poorer.
49
 
The CSTD, like the other organizations considered so far, is 
intergovernmental in structure.  However, it was mandated at WSIS to 
conduct its follow-up activities using a ―multi-stakeholder approach,‖
50
 and 
as such, has followed a practice of allowing NGOs to actively observe its 
                                         
47 See Ngaire Woods & Amrita Narlikar, Governance and the Limits of 
Accountability:  The WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank, 53 INT'L SOC. SCI. J. 505, 580 
(2001). 
48 See Civil Society Information Society Advisory Council, http://csisac.org/ (last 
visited Sep. 10, 2010). 
49 See Katia Tieleman, The Failure of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
(MAI) and the Absence of a Global Policy Policy Network, Global Public Policy Institute 
(April 10, 2000), http://www.gppi.net/fileadmin/gppi/Tieleman_MAI_GPP_Network.pdf. 
50 Tunis Agenda, supra note 19, art.105. 
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proceedings.  Whilst it is similar in this respect to WIPO, it does not have 
the same ―hard power‖ that WIPO does, being limited to a role of making 
recommendations only. 
Finally the IGF is the most open of any of the bodies considered here, in 
that civil society participates at IGF meetings in a position of equality with 
governmental and private sector representatives.  It is at least as transparent 
as any of the other institutions considered—though not completely so, as its 
Multi-stakeholder Advisory Group (MAG) meets in private.  Even so, for 
all its formal openness, the civil society's actual influence at the IGF on the 
development of intellectual property policy is very limited, largely because 
the IGF has yet shied away from its mandate to produce 
recommendations,
51
 and failed to develop links to other institutions that 
would allow policy makers to take such recommendations into account.
52
 
In this context, recall that the Aarhus Convention requires not only that 
policy development processes be open to participation, but also that ―[t]he 
result of the public participation . . . be taken into account as far as 
possible.‖  As even the UN Secretary-General has observed, the IGF has not 




B. Summary of Best Practices 
 
Having progressed from the generality of the Aarhus and WSIS 
principles on transparency and public participation in governance to the 
more specific structures and processes of the existing institutions of the 
intellectual property regime, it is possible to draw out some best practices.  
This does not mean that the existing institutions are the best they could be.  
On the contrary, if the institutions of the intellectual property regime are to 
be assessed against the principles of transparency and participation we 
derived earlier, each such institution has considerable room for 
improvement.  (This even extends to the IGF, notwithstanding that it was an 
outcome of the WSIS process.) 
Having said this, some best practices are already in place.  Taking 
transparency, there is no longer much room for argument about the 
appropriate content of this norm.  Even the WTO, the least participatory of 
the organizations studied, posts all of its official documents online, and 
most of the other institutions also make available negotiating texts.  Adding 
to this, most of those institutions (especially WIPO, the OECD and the IGF) 
                                         
51 See id. art. 72(g). 
52 Malcolm, supra note 45, at 513-521. 
53 See U. N. Secretary-General, supra note 28. 
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also freely provide background materials and studies, as well as briefing 
sessions on their policy activities.  Thus, it can be confidently posited that 
these are the basic best practices for transparency of governance in the 
intellectual property regime. 
As for participation, more variance can be seen, but there are four main 
options amongst the institutions considered here: 
 
1. A ―passive‖ observer role, in which opportunities for 
speaking with delegates and distributing documents are 
limited (as at the WTO Ministerial Conference). 
2. An ―active‖ observer role, in which NGO representatives can 
more directly interact with delegates and distribute 
documents (as at WIPO and the CSTD). 
3. Formal permanent advisory groups, providing a defined 
pathway for input from civil society on all policy proposals 
(such as the OECD's CSISAC). 
4. A multi-stakeholder governance structure that affords 
governmental and civil society delegates a position of 
equality (as at the IGF). 
 
An important observation to be made here is that in general, an inverse 
relationship exists between the openness to participation of an organization, 
and the degree of ―legalization‖
54
 or ―hardness‖ of its output. In other 
words, the institutions that produce hard law (the WTO and WIPO) tend to 
be more closed than those that produce soft law (the OECD and CSTD), 
with the IGF—which doesn't even yet produce recommendations—being 
the most open of all, but to the least advantage of civil society.  Therefore, 
in considering best practices on participation, we must make practical 
allowance for the fact that governments will not be inclined to grant civil 
society free rein within institutions that have the power to conclude hard or 
binding law.  Even so, options 2 and 3 above can still be considered 
possible best practices for institutions of any character within the 
intellectual property regime. 
This leads to the question, how does ACTA stack up against these 




                                         
54 See Kenneth W Abbot, et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT'L ORG. 401 
(2000). 
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Before attempting to answer this, it must be understood that ACTA 
actually represents two, quite separate, institutions. The first is the group of 
countries that is (at the time of writing) negotiating the text of the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement itself, at a series of closed meetings around 
the world. 
The second, and perhaps ultimately more important institution is the 
multilateral treaty organization that will come into being once the ACTA 
negotiations are concluded and the agreement is signed.
55
  This organization 
will comprise of an ACTA Committee constituted by each of the 
signatories, and possibly further ad hoc committees and working groups 
that the Committee may establish.
56
 
The transparency and participatory openness of ACTA will therefore be 
considered first in relation to the negotiation phase of ACTA, and then with 
respect to the ACTA Committee and any sub-groups.  
 
A. Negotiation Phase 
 
Beginning with the transparency of the negotiation phase, the best 
practices established above would require: 
 
 Access to the negotiation texts, before and after each round 
of negotiation, as is the practice at WIPO.  Instead, there has 
only been one official release of text in April 2010,
57
 
following the Wellington round of talks, which occurred 
only after five years of closed-door negotiations and in the 
wake of the full text being leaked in March.
58
 
 Institutionalized and regular briefing sessions to civil 
                                         
55 These comments are based on the latest full text of ACTA available at the time of 
writing (August 17, 2010), which is the leaked version from the July 2010 round of 
negotiations in Lucerne.  See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Informal 
Predecisional/Deliberative Draft:  July. 1, 2010, PIJIP IP ENFORCEMENT DATABASE, 
http://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta (follow ―Full Leaked Text Dated July 1, 
2010‖ hyperlink) [hereinafter ACTA Draft – July 1, 2010]. 
56 See ACTA Draft – July 1, 2010, supra note 55, art. 5.1(1), (3)(a). 
57 See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Informal Predecisional/Deliberative 
Draft:  April 21, 2010, PIJIP IP ENFORCEMENT DATABASE, 
http://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta (follow ―Official Consolidated ACTA Text 
Prepared for Public Release, April 21, 2010‖ hyperlink) [hereinafter ACTA Draft – April 
21, 2010]. 
58 See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Informal Predecisional/Deliberative 
Draft:  Jan. 18, 2010, PIJIP IP ENFORCEMENT DATABASE, 
http://sites.google.com/site/iipenforcement/acta (follow ―Full Leaked Text Dated Jan. 18, 
2010‖ hyperlink) [hereinafter ACTA Draft – Jan. 18, 2010]. 
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society, such as those conducted by WIPO
59
 and the 
OECD.
60
  Instead, the only briefing sessions held have been 
those that some of the negotiating parties have chosen to 
hold in their own countries, on an irregular and ad hoc basis. 
 Coordinated and regular release of background materials on 
the negotiations, such as those released by the IGF before 
each of its meetings.
61
  In fact only one joint fact sheet has 
been produced, in March 2010, with some of the negotiating 
parties having sporadically released other materials.
62
 
 Such materials must also be disseminated to the public. Short 
of doing so actively through a public relations office, a 
minimum requirement met by all the other institutions 
analyzed is the use of a central institutional Web site.  No 
such thing exists for ACTA. Rather, what few materials have 
been released have been disseminated mainly by civil 





Thus ACTA meets none of the basic best practices for transparency of 
the existing institutions of the intellectual property policy regime. 
The provision made for public participation in the ACTA negotiations is 
no better.  Based on the model established by the other institutions 
examined here, civil society is entitled to expect: 
 
 Access to the negotiation venue, through a lightweight 
                                         
59 See WIPO Information Meeting on Intellectual Property Financing, WIPO, 
http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/2009/ip_fin_ge_09/index.html (last visited Sep. 10, 2010) 
(describing a recent open informational meeting on intellectual property financing). 
60 An OECD Forum, open to the public, is held in conjunction with the annual 
Ministerial Meeting.  SeeOECD Forum, OECD, 
http://www.oecd.org/department/0,3355,en_2649_34493_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited 
Sep. 10, 2010). 
61 INTERNET GOVERNANCE FORUM, IGF, PROGRAMME FOR THE 2010 MEETING, JULY 
15, 2010 (2010), available at 
http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/2010/ProgrammePaper.15.07.2010.v2.doc. 
62 For one such document distributed in South Korea, see ANTI-COUNTERFEITING 
TRADE AGREEMENT (ACTA) FACT SHEET (March 25, 2010), 
http://www.mofat.go.kr/webmodule/htsboard/hbd/hbdread.jsp?typeID=6&boardid=10252
&seqno=327174 (last visited Sep. 10, 2010). 
63 Australia has published information on its government site.  See Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) – Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/acta/ (last visited Sep 11, 2010). 
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accreditation process, and the ability to observe the 
proceedings.  No such provision has been made for any of 
the ACTA negotiation rounds.  Indeed, even the location of 
the venue of most of the rounds has been kept secret. 
 
Rights for NGO representatives to speak to the negotiating assembly 
and to submit documents, as for example is the case at WIPO.  Needless to 
say, in view of the failure to even grant access to the negotiation venue, 
these rights have not been afforded.  Some of the negotiating parties have 




B. Implementation Phase 
 
Once ACTA has been concluded and signed, amongst the powers of the 
ACTA Committee will be: 
 
 To set its own rules and procedures.65 
 To consider any amendments to the Agreement.66 
 To make recommendations regarding implementation and 
operation of the Agreement, including endorsing best 
practice guidelines relating thereto.
67
 
 To share information and best practices on reducing 
intellectual property rights infringements, including 





Transparency and participation are no less important to civil society in 
respect of these ongoing policy setting and coordination activities as they 
have been in respect of the negotiation of the original Agreement. 
In this context, the following points describe the transparency that civil 
society is entitled to expect from ACTA, based on the best practices 
identified from other institutions in the intellectual property policy regime: 
 
 All official documents of the ACTA Committee should be 
openly published, as are similar documents from all the other 
                                         
64 See Ermert, supra note 5 (describing a 2009 European consultation meeting). 
65 See ACTA Draft – July 1, 2010, supra note 55, art.5.1(4). 
66 Id. art.5.1(2)(c) 6.4. 
67 Id. art.5.1(3)(c). 
68 Id. art.5.1(3)(d). 
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institutions studied in this paper.  These will include the 
rules, procedures, recommendations and best practice 
guidelines described above, as well as proposed amendments 
to the Agreement.  Whether such documents will in fact be 
openly released is yet unknown, as the ACTA text is silent 
on this point. 
 Additionally, negotiating drafts of the above should be 
released, to borrow a phrase from the Aarhus Convention, 
―at an appropriate stage, and while options are still open.‖
69
  
Again, we do not know whether this will be the case (but 
might reasonably guess, from the conduct of the ACTA 
negotiations to date, that it will not be). 
 The domestic implementation of ACTA by its members 
should also be transparent. On this count, the draft ACTA 
text does actually have something to say—though we do not 
yet know exactly what, as the current draft of the agreement 
contains two alternative sets of provisions.
70
  In general, 
however, it will probably require national laws, procedures 
and judicial decisions on IP enforcement to be published 
openly. 
 
Thus, the standard of transparency that civil society can expect from 
ACTA into the future can best be described as unknown.  As to its 
expectations of participation in the operation of ACTA: 
 
 If it is too much to expect that NGOs should be able to join 
the ACTA Committee as members, following the model of 
the IGF, then it should at least be possible for delegations to 
appoint NGO advisors to attend Committee meetings with 
them.  In fact, wording in the officially released draft text did 
accommodate this.
71
 However, this has been removed from 
the current draft. 
 There should be a simple and accessible procedure for NGOs 
to seek accreditation to attend the meetings of the ACTA 
Committee as active observers.  At present, this is not 
                                         
69 See Aarhus convention, supra note 14, art.8.  
70 See ACTA Draft – July 1, 2010, supra note 55, art.4.3. 
71 See ACTA Draft – April 21, 2010, supra note 57, art 5.5(1). 
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guaranteed.  A specific provision of the earlier public draft 
that would have allowed the Committee to invite 
―international organizations active in the field of intellectual 
property and . . . non-governmental groups of intellectual 
property stakeholders‖ to attend sessions ―or parts thereof.‖
72
  
Whilst this provision was inadequate, in that it arguably left 
it for the Committee to take the initiative to extend such an 
invitation, even this weak provision has since been removed. 
 Civil society should be consulted by the Committee in 
discussions over the amendment and development of the 
Agreement, the drafting of rules, procedures, 
recommendations and best practice guidelines, and ―any 
other matter that may affect the implementation and 
operation of this Agreement.‖
73
  This could best be done 
through a permanent civil society advisory committee such 
as the OECD's CSISAC, or the IGF's (multi-stakeholder, in 
that case) MAG.  Another option is the establishment of a 
dedicated civil society liaison office similar to the External 
Relations offices of WIPO and the WTO.  However, in either 
case, no such provisions exist.  The draft only specifies that 
the Committee may (not shall) ―seek the advice of non-
governmental persons or groups.‖
74
 
The future scope for civil society participation in the activities of ACTA 
is therefore unknown at best and nonexistent at worst.  Certainly, civil 
society can gain no comfort from the current draft text that its interests will 
be observed, and has every reason to suspect otherwise from the conduct of 
the present ACTA negotiations. 
Thus in sum, considering both the negotiation and implementation 
stages, ACTA fails to comply with the basic norms and best practices of 
transparency and participation that have been established by other 
institutions in the intellectual property policy regime.  Such an institution 
lacks democratic legitimacy as an actor in the regime, and this will 
inevitably impact upon its perceived authority by other actors and upon 
compliance with the norms it promulgates.
75
 
                                         
72 Id. art 5.6. 
73 ACTA Draft – July 1, 2010, supra note 55, art.5.1(2)(e). 
74 Id. art.5.1(3)(b). 
75  See generally THOMAS M FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS 
16 (1990). 





Strict intergovernmentalism remains unchallenged as the model for 
development of global public policy on intellectual property issues.  But in 
other regimes of governance, this is no longer the case.  This paper 
described the regime of international environmental law, in which the 
Aarhus Convention requires its members to uphold the principles of 
transparency of information, public participation in decision-making, and 
the provision of access to justice.  It also described the Internet governance 
regime, in which the process criteria established at WSIS call upon 
institutions of Internet governance to act in a manner that is multilateral, 
transparent and democratic, with the full involvement of all stakeholders in 
their respective roles. 
The global regime for intellectual property rights raises transnational 
public policy issues of no lesser importance than those raised by the 
environmental and Internet governance regimes, yet it lacks similar broad 
principles to guide its institutions in designing structures and processes that 
support public interest representation. 
There are signs that this is changing.  For example, the WIPO 
Development Agenda directs that the organization's norm-setting activities 
―be a participatory process, which takes into consideration the interests and 
priorities of all WIPO Member States and the viewpoints of other 
stakeholders, including accredited inter-governmental organizations (IGOs) 
and NGOs,‖
76
 and pledges ―[t]o enhance measures that ensure wide 
participation of civil society at large in WIPO activities in accordance with 
its criteria regarding NGO acceptance and accreditation, keeping the issue 
under review.‖ 
But more is needed, and the principles established must apply to all 
actors in the regime, not only one.  Ultimately, such principles should come 
in the shape of a framework convention,
77
 or at least an intergovernmental 
summit document such as the Geneva Statement of Principles from WSIS.  
But in the meantime, civil society including academia, and perhaps in 
cooperation with supportive private sector actors and governments, could 
begin to develop a statement of such principles independently. 
                                         
76 World Intellectual Property Organization, The 45 Adopted Recommendations 
under the WIPO Development Agenda, art. 15, 42 (Oct. 3, 2007), 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-development/en/agenda/recommendations.pdf. 
77 See John Mathiason, A Framework Convention: An Institutional Option for 
Internet Governance, THE INTERNET GOVERNANCE PROJECT (Dec. 20, 2004), 
http://www.internetgovernance.org/pdf/igp-fc.pdf. 
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For the Internet governance regime (which already starts from a 
stronger base, in the WSIS process criteria), there exists such a project to 
develop a code of good practice on information, participation and 
transparency.
78
  The code is a joint project of the Council of Europe, 
Association for Progressive Communications (APC) and the UNECE (not 
coincidentally, the host body of the Aarhus Convention). 
The absence of anything similar for the global intellectual property 
rights regime makes it more difficult for civil society to normatively 
challenge the legitimacy of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 
which has failed to meet the public's expectations during its negotiation 
phase, and seems unlikely to do better once it has been agreed.  Even so, it 
has been possible in this short paper to demonstrate ACTA's flagrant 
neglect of basic principles of transparency and public participation, which 
were drawn from other regimes but which are supported by best practices in 
existing intellectual property policy institutions. 
It now falls to civil society, in the short term, to continue to lobby for 
the inclusion of better structures and processes for public interest 
representation in ACTA, both during its negotiation phase and in the 
institution that is formed once it is agreed.  These will include the 
institutionalization of access to information, and measures for public 
representation through active observation and/or a permanent civil society 
advisory committee. 
In the longer term, it is necessary to advocate for the development and 
promulgation of general principles of transparency and participation against 
which not only ACTA, but all other actors in the intellectual property 
regime can be judged. 
                                         
78 See Council of Europe et al., Code of Good Practice on Information, Participation 
and Transparency in Internet Governance (June 2010), 
http://www.intgovcode.org/images/c/c1/COGP_IG_Version_1.1_June2010.pdf. 
